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Abstract
This paper begins with a discussion of prior research in the field of mutual fund
performance and its determinants, namely Morningstar ratings. Then an examination is
conducted regarding Morningstar rating’s predictive ability of the performance of U.S.
Growth mutual funds from 2015 – 2018 using similar data and methodology as the
study by Morey and Gottesman (2006). This study concludes that the ratings are in fact
a strong predictor of performance for the selected funds over this time period and that
the results are monotonic in that 5-star rated funds perform better than 4-star and so on
to 1-star rated funds which are the lowest performers. The implications of these results
support the use of Morningstar ratings but investors should remain wary about individual
funds and also take note of the economic conditions during the time period that this
study examines.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A mutual fund is the go-to choice for investors to achieve diversification and
market returns for low costs and transparent management. As of 2017, there was more
money in mutual funds than the total net assets of all US commercial banks by over two
trillions dollars. But how does the average investor go about selecting which mutual
fund in which to invest their hard-earned money? Some might use fees, past returns, or
management style, but the simplest criterion to examine would be that of a fund’s
Morningstar rating. Morningstar is a rating agency that assigns funds a star rating from
one, which is the lowest, to five, which is the highest. In the age of Yelp reviews and
Uber ratings, Americans are more familiar than ever with simple, straightforward rating
systems and rely heavily on them to make decisions from who to hire to where to eat
dinner. Because of this, many funds use their assigned Morningstar rating in their
advertising rather than other traits such as their own return history.
On their website, Morningstar describes their star rating as “a purely quantitative,
backward-looking measure of a fund’s past performance.” The difference between
comparing a fund’s past performance to future performance and Morningstar rating to
future performance is not only that the rating is relative to other funds of similar size and
in similar categories but also that the ratings are monotonic whereas returns can be
calculated to multiple decimals.

Given the wide use of Morningstar ratings, it is important to consider whether
these ratings are worth being used to select mutual funds. This paper will discuss prior
research in the field of mutual funds and Morningstar ratings and then perform an
examination of whether these Morningstar ratings have any predictive ability over the
future performance of the funds that they rate.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Mutual Funds and Outperformance
In a recent paper by Gruber (2012, p. 3), mutual funds were described as “one of the
fastest growing type of financial intermediary in the American economy.” Mutual funds
are popular for a number of reasons, including ease of diversification and access to
markets that an individual investor would not typically have on their own. These traits
are derived from the structure of mutual funds in which investors pool their money for
the purpose of investing in a wide range of assets such as stocks, bonds, commodities,
derivatives, and other assets. These funds are run by portfolio managers who typically
charge a small fee and the returns (or losses) are distributed back to the investors
based on the amount invested. The performance of these funds is typically measured
against a stated benchmark index outlined in the prospectus.
Outperformance is a commonly debated topic in the realm of mutual funds, as
well as in the world of investing in general. For the purposes of mutual funds, this is

defined as the ability to deliver returns higher than that of the comparable benchmark of
the fund. There is a substantial amount of research and resulting literature dedicated to
answering the questions of whether mutual funds are capable of outperforming and if
so, how. All of the studies result in different findings that land all across the board, up
and down the spectrum. Lack of consensus is what keeps this topic continuously
fascinating and out of it comes new and innovative ideas for measuring exactly how
these funds function and what factors can lead to outperformance.
In Kosowski et al. (2006), the authors land on the far end of the spectrum that
states that outperformance is not a function of luck and can be executed based on skill.
By examining twenty-five years of mutual fund returns they negate the notion that
outperformance can be explained by sampling variability and determine that some
managers are in fact worth paying high-fees for and that manager selection is a vital
step in the process of mutual fund investing. On the other hand, Fama and French
(2011) represent the other extreme, concluding that fund outperformance is almost
entirely attributed to luck and that no manager decisions show statistically significant in
contributing to outperformance. Albeit, using slightly different methodology and time
periods, it is still astounding that two studies examining the same topic can result in
such varied conclusions.
2a. Predictors of Outperformance

2a(I). Expenses and Fees
Given the popularity of mutual funds as investment vehicles, selecting the correct
mutual fund is still a very important decision. If a mutual fund is an individual’s primary
investment vehicle, even a couple of percentage points, over time and after
compounding, can have major life implications. There are many different attributes of a
mutual fund that one can use to select which fund they will end up investing in. One
attribute is the fees that a fund charges, usually a small percentage of your investment
or returns. Another is the expense ratio which is the amount of operating expenses,
management fees, administrative fees, and other asset-based costs (excluding
brokerage fees) incurred by the funds compared to the amount of overall fund assets.
One can also select a fund based on the manager of the fund and the manager’s style
of investing or past performance.
Of these attributes, the predictor of outperformance most supported by relevant
literature is that of expenses, specifically expense ratio. Studies by Carhart (1997),
Dellva and Olson (1998), O’Neal (2004), Haslem, Baker and Smith (2008), and
Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009) all contribute supporting evidence in their conclusions
that low expense ratio funds outperform funds with relatively higher expense ratios. In
particular, the paper by Carhart (1997) which examines almost 2000 U.S. equity funds

from 1962 – 1993, demonstrates that a one percent increase in expense ratio results in
a 1.54 percent decrease in fund performance. More recently, Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu
(2009) offer support to this theory by finding that worse performing (load-adjusted) funds
charge higher expense ratios than funds offering higher load-adjusted returns. A study
from the Financial Research Corporation in 2002 (Predicting Mutual Fund Performance
II: After the Bear (Financial Research Corporation)) as well as a Morningstar study by
Kinnel (2010) found that a fund’s expense ratio is not only the best predictor of
outperformance but the only factor that produced statistically significant results.
The rationale behind the correlation between expense ratios and outperformance is that
funds that are capable of outperforming consistently are in higher demand and therefore
able to charge more to investors who wish to contribute to the fund. In this vein,
Wermers (2000) and Kosowski et al. (2007) find that higher expenses are justified for
some funds, as the managers are capable of outperformance via active management.
As with any other research around outperformance and mutual funds, there is a
significant amount of findings that support that it is not expense ratio, rather a different
factor or no factor at all. Cemers and Petajisto (2009) and Patejisto (2013) conclude that
the degree to which the holdings in a mutual fund are different than those of the
benchmark is the main driver of outperformance. A redemption fee is a fee applied to
shares held for short time periods and studies by Dellva and Olson (1998), Finke,

Nanigian and Waller (2009), and Ismailescu and Morey (2012) find a positive
relationship between the size and duration of the redemption fee and fund performance.
There are also studies from Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003) and Cremers, Dreissen,
Maenhout and Weinbaum (2009) that argue that funds with incentive fees outperform
those without incentive fees. Incentive fees are paid to managers as a reward for strong
performance and are similar to what is referred to “skin in the game” or high ownership
stake by managers.
So what is to be drawn from all of these studies that present varying and often
contradictory results about expenses loads and other fees? Well, it’s important to note
that generally researchers find a negative correlation between outperformance and a
fund’s expense/loads, but this is not canon and some active managers can, in fact,
deliver consistent returns that exceed those of the benchmark and are worthy of their
fees. Incentive and manager fees seem to play some role in outperformance, but again
not every study supports this. All in all, there is no one factor or attribute of a fund that
can determine whether this fund or manager will be capable of delivering desirable
returns.
2a(II). Past Performance
An obvious consideration when selecting a mutual fund is the past performance
of a fund; that is, how has the fund done in the past regarding returns compared to the

returns of the benchmark. Like the factors discussed in the section prior, the findings
from relevant literature on the subject vary significantly.
Studies that display that performance persists (outperformers will outperform
again and vice versa) include those of Grinblatt and Titman (1992) and Hendricks, Patel
and Zeckhauser (1994) and Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996). However, studies including
Carhart (1997) find that this persistence is often due to momentum stocks and
eventually conclude that the additional transaction costs of investing in these
momentum stocks are so high that they eradicate gains from following this strategy.
This means that persistence only ends up applying to poor performing funds. Thus the
consensus is that outperforming will persist up to a few quarters while poor performance
will typically persist longer and neither should necessarily be used entirely to select a
fund.
2b. Morningstar Ratings
It is clear that of all the factors considered thus far, none are satisfactory in
selecting a fund. Expenses, fees, and past performance were good predictors in some
findings, bad in others, and inconclusive in most. There are many private providers of
mutual fund “ratings.” The most famous and regarded of which is that from Morningstar.
Morningstar uses an algorithm that involves a combination of risk-adjusted past
performance and awards mutual funds a star rating from one to five. This is inherently

appealing to investors because of its simplicity and because it has become familiar and
standard in the industry. These ratings have become so popular in fact that they have a
significant impact on fund flows as evidenced in findings from Del Guerico and Tkac
(2005). They conclude that a fund with a 5-star rating produces inflows of 53 percent
above the normal flow while downgrades in star ratings can result in significant
outflows, more so than would be justified solely from a change in performance.
Due to the commonality and usage of these ratings, a substantial amount of
research has been done on whether ratings have any sort of predictive ability including
studies from Blake and Morey (2000), Morey (2002a, 2002b, 2005) and Morey and
Gottesman (2006). Once again we see contradictory results from different studies.
Some studies find that funds that receive higher ratings relative to others do not result in
outperformance, like Blake and Morey (2000). In their findings, the 5-star funds
performed about the same as 3-star rated funds after ratings were established. Phillips
and Kinniry (2010) support these findings.
In contrast, Morey and Gottesman (2006) again tested the predictive ability of
Morningstar ratings after Morningstar updated their methodology in rating mutual funds.
In this study, they found that the new rating system was, at least in some part,
predictive of future fund performance as higher rated funds outperformed lower. In this
study, they even found that funds with a rating one star lower than other funds

performed lower (so 5-star performed better than 4-star which performed better than
3-star and so on).
In conclusion, there is a wealth of dissonance, contradiction, and uncertainty in
all the studies considered in this review as well as in the industry as a whole. No factor
seems to be consistent in predicting performance, but on the other hand, every factor
seems to play some sort of role. I have decided to reexamine the Morningstar rating’s
predictive ability because of the (perhaps exaggerated) common use of the ratings and
the variability in past studies. The contrast in these findings, as well as the fact that they
could be considered outdated, are justification for this study in which I recreate the
Morey and Gottesman (2006) study with data from 2015-2018.
3. METHODOLOGY
I will take the Morningstar rating on January 1, 2015 for all US Equity Large Cap Growth
mutual funds (single share class) and measure monthly mean returns, using the Sharpe
ratio and the 30-day T-bill rate, through January 1, 2018. I will then use a regression
analysis to compare the funds’ ratings with the performance. A regression analysis
allows a comparison of the performance of each group of funds based on their
Morningstar rating. I will use the 3-star rated funds as the reference group because it is
the center rating and will allow me to see how much better (or worse) 5-star and 4-star

funds perform and how much worse (or better) 2-star and 1-star funds perform,
relatively.
To select funds I use the January 2015 Morningstar Mutual Funds Data Disk.
This disk provides data for funds as of January 1, 2015. From this disk, I then select all
domestic equity funds that received an overall Morningstar mutual fund rating. This
produced a sample of 4,700 funds. I use domestic equity funds as these styles are the
most popular for domestic investors.
I then narrow the sample by eliminating replicate funds. Replicate funds are
funds that are identical to another fund in our sample except that they are sold as
different share classes. Since I do not want to over count the number of funds in the
sample, I include only one of the fund’s share classes in the sample. By eliminating
these replicate funds, funds in other currencies, and those that did not have a ticker
symbol or Morningstar rating on January 1, 2015, I attain a sample of 305 funds.
For each of the 305 funds, I then attempt to obtain the out-of-sample returns of
these funds. For a large majority of the funds (approximately 80 percent) obtaining the
out-of-sample returns is simply a matter of following the fund’s future performance.
However, for about 20 percent of the sample, the funds disappear prior to January 1,
2018 as a result of liquidations or mergers. This means that my study is affected by

survivorship bias, but the purpose of the results are for directional insight instead of an
exact correlation calculation.
To calculate the ratings, Morningstar uses load-adjusted returns to reflect the
extra expenses that the funds charge. However, the monthly fund returns that are
available on Morningstar data are not adjusted for front or deferred loads. As a result, it
is important for us to adjust the out-of-sample returns for loads when investigating
whether the ratings are able to predict future performance. Moreover, for investors,
load-adjusted performance is what they are typically concerned with.
3a. Performance
A risk-adjusted performance metric is used to measure out-of-sample
performance: the Sharpe ratio. For each performance metric, only load-adjusted returns
are examined.
Sharpe ratio:
where are the monthly returns in excess of the 30-day T-bill rate, , of the it h mutual
fund during the out-of-sample period, and is the standard deviation of the .
3b. Predictive Performance
A cross-sectional dummy variable regression analysis is used to examine the
out-of-sample predictive performance:
where is the out-of-sample performance metric for fund i.

D5 = 1 if the fund received 5-star overall Morningstar rating as of January 1, 2015, 0 if
not,
D4 = 1 if the fund received a 4-star overall Morningstar rating as of January 1, 2015, 0 if
not,
D2 = 1 if the fund received a 2-star overall Morningstar rating as of January 1, 2015, 0 if
not,
D1 = 1 if the fund received a 1-star overall Morningstar rating as of January 1, 2015, 0 if
not,
i = 1 through N, where N is the total number of funds in the sample.
In the above equation, the 3-star fund group for the Morningstar sample is the
reference group for the dummy variable regressions. Hence, when using the Sharpe
ratio as the out-of-sample performance measure, the coefficient, γ0 represents the
expected Sharpe ratio when all the dummy variables are equal to 0, and the coefficients
γ1 through γ4 represent the differences between the dummy variables and the
reference group. For example, a negative γ1 implies the group of 4-star funds performs
worse than the group of 5-star funds; a positive γ1 implies the group of 4-star funds
outperforms the 5-star fund group. The t-statistics on the coefficients provide a test of

the significance of the difference between an individual dummy group and the reference
group.
I use the 3-star funds as a reference group because it provides a center from
which I can compare the performance of the higher-rated and lower-rated group funds.
If the ratings accurately predict out-of-sample performance I should see increasingly
positive (and significant) coefficients for five and four and increasingly negative (and
significant) coefficients for two and one.
4. RESULTS
The results of the dummy variable regression are presented in the table below.
Five has a positive coefficient that is greater than four which also has a positive
coefficient and two has a negative coefficient which is greater than one which also has a
negative coefficient. The p-values are all low enough for the results to be statistically
significant at a 5% significance level, other than the two-star rated funds which are
significant at a 15% level. Based on this data, Morningstar ratings are in fact predictive
of mutual fund performance and funds with higher star ratings deliver higher
load-adjusted returns than those with a rating lower relative rating.
5. CONCLUSION
In this study, I perform an examination of how the Morningstar rating system
predicts future fund performance. I investigate the predictive power of the Morningstar
rating system using all domestic Growth equity funds that were rated by Morningstar as

of January 1, 2015 and then examine the performance of all these funds over the next
three years, out-of-sample, January 2015 – January 2018.
I find widespread support for the notion that the new Morningstar rating system
can predict future performance, at least in the first three years out of sample.
Specifically, I find that higher rated funds, for the most part, significantly outperform
lower rated funds. Moreover, the effect is relatively monotonic as even the next to
lowest rated funds (2-star funds) significantly outperform the lowest rated funds (1-star
funds). These results are quite different from those of Blake and Morey (2000) and
Morey (2002b) which indicated that the previous Morningstar rating system did not
predict future performance well.
One explanation for this disparity may be fund expenses. Research by Carhart
(1997) has found that fund expenses are inversely related to future fund performance.
That is, funds with low expenses seem to perform better in the future than those with
high expenses. Thus, an explanation for our results could be that before the change in
the ratings methodology, 5-star funds had similar expenses to the other funds and
hence did not perform better in the future than other, lower-rated funds. Yet, after the
change in the methodology, 5-star funds have significantly lower expenses than other
funds and thus the high star rating can predict strong future performance.

Another, better explanation may be the “hot hands phenomenon” as first
described by Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1988). They find that there is short-term
persistence in fund performance. Given that my out-of-sample period is only three years
long, I may be capturing this effect. Indeed, if the methodology of the rating system was
flawed before June 2002, it is possible that the hot hands effect would not have shown
up in performance prediction results from the old Morningstar ratings methodology.
Now, with the improvements in the ratings methodology, the hot hands phenomenon
may surface.
It’s important to take note of the time period and economic conditions of the time
period in which these returns were recorded. 2015 – 2018 was a very positive economic
environment in which the stock market consistently rose with less than historically
average corrections or downturns. It also was a very low interest rate environment,
coming off of the recession but after full recovery which allowed business to reinvest
heavily. This was also a time period characterized by a notable amount of share
buybacks from companies, inflating stock prices over time. Given all of this, mutual
funds required little strategy other than tracking the market to deliver returns. The
methodology of this study did not consider the benchmark to which these funds were
matched but only relative performance to funds in the sample. This being said, funds
that performed poorer over this time period could very well be positioned to outperform

in a bear market or a time period with more corrections and less stable economic
forces.
The implications of these findings are far-reaching considering the wide use of
Morningstar ratings by investors to determine which funds to invest in. The conclusion
that the ratings are predictive of performance means that the heightened inflows into
higher rated funds found by Del Guerico and Tkac (2005) are justified. It also means
that Morningstar has successfully honed its rating methodology. Investors should
remain wary, because although the sample reflects that the ratings are predictive of
returns, it does not mean that individual funds necessarily will outperform or
underperform based on rating.
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